2202.04782
Heterogeneous Mixed Populations of Coordinating, Anticoordinating, and Imitating Individuals
Hien Le, Mohaddeseh Rajaee, Pouria Ramazi
correctmedium confidence
- Category
- Not specified
- Journal tier
- Strong Field
- Processed
- Sep 28, 2025, 12:56 AM
- arXiv Links
- Abstract ↗PDF ↗
Audit review
The paper proves that the equilibrium set X* coincides with the set E of candidate states xr,j1,j1′ that satisfy the strict threshold inequalities for best-responders and the envelope inequalities for imitators (≥ if r>0, ≤ if r<m), which jointly force equality when 0<r<m (Theorem 4.5) . The paper’s construction of Cj1,j1′ and Dj1+1,j1′+1, the threshold conditions (4.1)–(4.2), and the necessity/sufficiency arguments via CM and DM appear explicitly in Lemmas 4.1–4.4 . The candidate solution reproduces the same characterization, uses the same CM/DM envelopes and the same activation-sequence invariance logic, and reaches X*=E with the same conditions, i.e., substantially the same proof as the paper’s Lemmas 4.2–4.4 and Theorem 4.5 .
Referee report (LaTeX)
\textbf{Recommendation:} minor revisions \textbf{Journal Tier:} strong field \textbf{Justification:} The paper provides a clean and correct equilibrium characterization for mixed populations of imitators and best-responders (both conformists and nonconformists). The proof structure is sound and leads to an algorithmic check for equilibria. Minor clarifications around assumptions and envelope definitions would further aid readers, but the core results are solid.